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BURFAU OF INTELLIGENCE AND RESEARCH

ASSESSMENTS AND RESEARCH

(U) CRUISE MISSILES AND THE CUBAN ANALOGY1/

Summary

Ambiguous threats have been part of Moscow's campaign against the NATO intermediaterange nuclear force (INF) missile program since even before its formal approval in December 1979.

In March 1982, Brezhnev warned that the Soviet Union would take steps to put the US in an "analogous position" should new American missiles be deployed in Europe. Several Soviet officials subsequently suggested that what Brezhnev had in mind was the deployment of sea-launched cruise missile (SLCM) carriers near US shores, not the reintroduction of land-based missiles in Cuba.

(S/NF) Cruise missile deployments would pose severe launch- and flight-detection problems for the US, at least in the short run. The US at present has only a limited capability to detect lowflying cruise missiles approaching its territory.

(S/EX/NF) More significantly, however, Moscow's highlighting of the potential threat of Soviet cruise missiles targeted against the US is probably also intended to move Washington toward negotiations on their worldwide limitation. the 1974 Ford-Brezhnev summit in Vladivostok, one of Moscow's most persistent aims in SALT II, INF, and now the START talks has been to limit US cruise missile deployments. The Kremlin argues that there can be no central strategic or theater systems limitations without restrictions on cruise missiles, which if otherwise allowed to proliferate would undermine negotiated balances.

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See appendix for a chronology of Soviet statements.

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- ii -

(S/EX/NF) Moscow currently views the weapon as a genuine threat to Soviet national security. To avert the danger and induce the US to lessen if not completely remove the threat, the USSR evidently hopes to convince the US of its own eventual vulnerability to Soviet cruise missiles. To this end, the USSR is pushing ahead with its cruise missile development program. Its first long-range, land-attack SLCM may be ready for deployment as early as 1983.

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